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直觉上指令式规范的逻辑推理是有效的。然而“约根森困境”指出，凡是逻辑处理的命题都有真值，指令式规范不具有真值，故逻辑不能处理指令式规范。对困境的回答分为规范逻辑怀疑论和规范逻辑肯定论。传统的怀疑论和肯定论都不能回应复杂的规范现象。肯定论的错误在于，指令式规范虽然是可理解的，但它是一种非认知现象，是权威对特定事态的特定态度，因而无法由逻辑处理；传统怀疑论则不能说明关于指令式规范的逻辑推理为何直觉上有效。承认指令式规范的实在性，同时引入道义逻辑的可能世界语义学，可以说明直觉上有效的规范逻辑是一种在道义逻辑的指导下对规范陈述的理想续写，从而为一种温和的怀疑论辩护。
Abstract：Intuitively, the logical reasoning of imperative norms seems valid. However, the “J9rgensen's Dilemma” points out that any proposition processed by logic has a truth value, while imperative norms do not have a truth value, so logic cannot deal with imperative norms. The responses to the dilemma are divided into normative logic skepticism and normative logic affirmationism. Traditional skepticism and affirmationism cannot respond to complex normative phenomena. The mistake of affirmationism consists in the fact that although imperative norms are intelligible, they are non-cognitive phenomenon, expressing specific attitude of the authority towards specific situation, and therefore they cannot be processed by logic; Traditional skepticism, on the other hand, cannot explain why the logical reasoning about imperative norms is intuitively valid. Acknowledging the reality of imperative norms and introducing the possible-world semantics of deontic logic can explain that the intuitively valid normative logic is an ideal continuation of normative statements under the guidance of deontic logic, thus defending a moderate skepticism.
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① 从结论上看，“怀疑论”实际上是一种“否定论”。但此用法已经得到广泛使用，故本文沿用之。
(1)虽然早期研究“约根森困境”的学者大多认为自己讨论的是一般规范性问题,但下文中以凯尔森为代表的学者只认可指令式规范。一种将两类规范混合的讨论参见[8]。
基本信息:
DOI：10.19484/j.cnki.1000-8934.2025.08.002
中图分类号:B81-0
引用信息:
[1]徐子煜.逻辑能处理指令式规范吗?[J].自然辩证法研究,2025,41(08):33-38+45.DOI:10.19484/j.cnki.1000-8934.2025.08.002.
基金信息:
教育部哲学社会科学研究后期资助重大项目“时代镜像中的法理学研究”(21JHQ012)