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认识事物本身是哲学的永恒追求。布兰顿的概念实在论可以说是解决这一问题的重要哲学进路，它超越了康德概念现象论，主张实在本身具有概念结构。通过系统阐释概念实在论的基本图景，包括贯通思想与世界的理性形式和核心特征双模态质形论，并深入考察支持这一实在论立场的规范性哲学基础，可以发现，布兰顿将概念内容、客观性及对事物自身的认识最终根植于予求理由的规范性实践和理由空间，有效消解了显象与物自身的二分法，为解决认识论难题提供了新视角。
Abstract：Brandom's conceptual realism is a significant philosophical approach that moves beyond Kantian conceptual phenomenalism, advocating that reality itself possesses a conceptual structure. This paper systematically explicates the basic picture of conceptual realism, including the rational form that connects thought and world and the core feature of bimodal hylomorphism. It also deeply examines the normative philosophical basis supporting this realist stance. Brandom ultimately grounds conceptual content, objectivity, and the knowledge of things-in-themselves in the normative practice of giving and asking for reasons and the space of reasons, effectively dissolving the dichotomy between appearance and thing-in-itself and offering a new perspective for solving epistemological problems.
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[4] Brandom R.A Tune Beyond Us,yet Ourselves:Reasons and Conceptual Realism[EB/OL].(2024-09-18)[2025-06-01].https://sites.pitt.edu/～rbrandom/Courses/2024%20Philosophy%20of%20Language/Texts/Brandom%20ATBUYO%2024-6-4%20c.pdf.
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(1)这是布兰顿2024年在北京师范大学“规范性哲学”系列讲座第四讲的授课内容,文本内容见其个人网站主页。
(2)这些成果包括吉尔伯特·哈曼(Gilbert Harman)关于推理活动与理由关系的区分;格里格·雷斯托(Greg Restall)和大卫·瑞普利(David Ripley)相继演算的双边规范语用学(bilateral normative pragmatics for sequent calculi),以澄清推理规范与话语推论实践中的逻辑推论和不相容理由关系之间的关系;基特·法因(Kit Fine)的致真者语义学及其相关的整分论的模态形而上学(truth-maker semantics and its associated mereological modal metaphysics);乌尔夫·赫洛比尔(Ulf Hlobil)的形式理论,该理论将法因语义结构中的逻辑推论和不相容的成真模态关系与双边语用学所解释的道义规范性理由关系统一起来。
(3)布兰顿对元语汇的深入研究,最早是在《言行之际》当中,其基本含义是关于某类语汇的语汇。在《逻辑-理由论》中,根据谈论对象和解释方式的不同,可区分为语义元词汇和语用元语汇两类;根据功能之分,可分为外在解释性理性元语汇(Extrinsic-explanatory rational metavocabularies,解释基础语汇的理由关系)和内在阐明性理性元语汇(Intrinsic-explicative rational metavocabularies,包括逻辑语汇和蕴含空间语义学,是关于理由关系和概念角色的模型论语义学)。
基本信息:
DOI：10.19484/j.cnki.1000-8934.2025.10.001
中图分类号:B085;N02
引用信息:
[1]李红.认识事物本身：布兰顿概念实在论的规范性哲学之维[J].自然辩证法研究,2025,41(10):3-12.DOI:10.19484/j.cnki.1000-8934.2025.10.001.
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金重大项目“规范性哲学研究”(21&ZD049)
2025-06-08
2025
2025-08-17
2025
1
2025-10-18
2025-10-18