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威廉姆森的E=K论题建立在外延性原则及命题性原则之上。这两条原则没有涉及对知识和证据的内涵性解释，这使得基于内涵性解读构建的首要反驳成为可能。这种反驳提出知识与证据的内涵涉及不同的认知关系，故而造成知识与证据的外延不相等。消解这种反驳的关键在于明确知识概念涉及的关系并非严格的二元关系，同时证据概念涉及的关系也并非严格的三元关系。从认知-行动机制这一视角，可以揭示E=K论题的深层实质是证据与知识共享同一个认知网络。
Abstract：E=K thesis rests on the principle of extensionality and propositionality. The two principles do not involve an intensional interpretation of knowledge and evidence, making it possible to construct the primary objection based on intensional readings. This objection posits the intensions of knowledge and evidence involving different cognitive relations. The key to resolving it lies in clarifying that the relationships involved in the concept of knowledge are not strictly binary, and those of evidence are not strictly ternary. From the perspective of cognitive-action mechanism, we can reveal that the underlying essence of E=K is that evidence and knowledge share the same cognitive network.
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(1)威廉姆森在《知识及其限度》中对“知识是命题”的表述主要集中在第一章,对“证据是命题”的表述主要集中在第九章。
(2)根据经典知识定义,知识衍推“获得辩护的真信念”。故而,如果把“知识”当作证据,那么根据经典的知识定义,就是在用“获得辩护的真信念”当作证据。
(3)威廉姆森认为FMSO的对象都是命题,因此,FMSO也可理解为“事实性命题态度”。
基本信息:
DOI：10.19484/j.cnki.1000-8934.2025.09.017
中图分类号:B842
引用信息:
[1]蔡文希,邱文豪.试论威廉姆森E=K论题的内涵性解释——从认知-行动机制视角看[J].自然辩证法研究,2025,41(09):121-126.DOI:10.19484/j.cnki.1000-8934.2025.09.017.
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金重点项目“智能哲学视阈下的归纳逻辑前沿问题研究”(23AZX018)